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One can then analyze science philosophically to discover how little philosophers and scien-
tists have interacted ... (their) kind of interdisciplinary blend is, I think, essential to getting 
closer to how science actually functions within the scientific community and within society 
and how it has performed its legitimizing role. (Woodward, 1989, p. 7) 
I. ABSTRACT 
Currently there is an unprecedented interest in ethological studies of nonhuman 
animals. Much of this interest is motivated by a desire to learn more about/ 
animals themselves. For scientists assuming this stance, a secondary goal is to 
use this knowledge to assess the place of humans in the natural order of t~ings, 
stressing continuity or discontinuity depending on one's views. Others, however, 
study animals primarily to apply this knowledge to human ~ehavior. We argue 
that behavioral research demands the rigorous application of methods
1 
that are 
minimally harmful to the animals being studied. We argue for a moderate, but 
rigorous and uncompromising, position on issues of animal welfare. A number 
of areas that in our opinion require careful scrutiny before research should be 
1 
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permitted are identified. It is a privilege to study nonhumans even in wha~ seem 
to be noninterventive situations, and we should reflect on what we are domg by 
empathizing with the animals that are being studied. From this point of view, 
ethological interests and philosophical concerns with morality, mind, and science 
complement one another. Thus, ethology and philosophy should inform one 
another with respect to the way in which animals are studied, and how data are 
an~lyzed, applied, ·and disseminated. 
II. A CLARIFICATION OF AIMS AND STANCES 
... man and the higher animals, especially the primates, have some few instincts in com-
mon. All have the same senses, intuitions, and sensations, .similar passions, affections, and 
emotions, even the more complex ones such as jealousy, suspicion, emulation, gratitude, and 
magnanimity; they practise deceit and are revengeful; they are sometimes susceptible to 
ridicule, and even have a sense of humor; they feel wonder and curiosity; they possess the 
same faculties of imitation, attention, deliberation, choice, memory, imagination, the associa-
tion of ideas, and reason though in very different degrees. (Darwin, 1871, p. 87) 
In this chapter we will be concerned with a broad range of issues that center 
on the theses that consideration of (1) ethological knowledge and methods of 
representation, interpretation, and explanation of behavioral data and (2) philo-
sophical concerns about explanation and morality complement one another in our 
quests to understand animals and to appreciate their moral status. The major 
areas we consider include: (1) the modem rise of the animal protection move-
ment, highlighting interactions betwe~n philosophical ideas and ethological in-
vestigation; (2) the philosophical concepts and arguments that are central to the 
debate over the moral status of animals; (3) the resistance to animal protectionist 
morality and the resistance to cognitivism and intentionalism; (4) practical issues 
concerning uses and abuses of animals; (5) how intervention influences our 
representations of animal subjects; and (6) the point of ethological inves.~igation. 
We contend that studying ?ther animals is a privilege even in -what appear to 
be noninterventive (e.g., field) circumstances. Research that is interventive, 
however slight, .requires justification, and alternatives must be sought when 
possible. A similar conclusion was reached by the participants in a symposium 
dealing with self-awareness in domestic animals (Wood-Gush et at., 1981; see 
also Caplan, 1983; Cobb, 1989). 
We also believe that it is incorrect to view animals as "nonconscious brutes" 
whose very existence and modes of life should be controlled by humans, and 
whose pains and sufferings should have no "rational claim upon our sympathy" 
(Carruthers, 1989, p. 268; see Section V.B.1). It is our position that diverse 
animals have cognitive and affective states and display intentional behavior of 
varying complexity (Dennett, 1983, 1987, 1989; de Waal, 1989; Mitchell, 
1990). These considerations provide important, but not the only, reasons for 
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ascribing serious moral status to them. Issues regarding the nature of animal 
minds are COmpleX, however, and W~' argue that methodologically a pluralist 
stance is the only tenable one when studying'animal behavior and animal minds 
(Dupre, 1988, 1990). Moreover, we do no_thave perfect knowledge of minds, 
whether our own, other human,,or animal, and our beliefs and actions should be 
informed by a healthy skepticism (Freud, 1964; Cherniak, 1986; Bekoff, 1988) 
even in assessments of pain and suffering. When there is a question, however, we 
should give the animal (and the human infant: Fitzgerald, 1987) the benefit of the 
doubt (Lloyd, 1989, p. 191). /'. ~~, 
Finally, it is clear that ethological research and its presentation have great 
effects on people's perceptions of how humans and animals do and should in-
teract. Most people in our society show great ihterest in movies, television 
shows, books, and magazines that portray animals; and the way in which animals 
are represented greatly influences stances on how they should be treated. For this 
reason ethologists, philosophers, and others who write about animals have great 
responsibilities. They interpret nonhumans tothe human world and therefore are 
the voice of the voiceless. 
III. ETHOLOGY, PHIL9SOPHY, AND THE ANIMAL 
PROTECTION MOVEMENT: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
We take from them their freedom, their health, and often their lives. Surely the least we can 
do is try to provide them with some of the things that could make their imprisonment more 
bearable. (Goodall, 1987, p. 577) 
Most people occasionally think about their place in the natural world. 
Often, even unknowingly, they take stances that are rooted in ancient systems of 
philosophical thought. From a historical point of view, it is not surprising that 
humans are concerned about animals. Humans evolved in close interaction with 
nonhumans (Toynbee, 1973; Thomas, 1983; Serpell, 1986; Ritvo, 1987; 
Dombrowski, 1988; Rowan, 1988; Aisenberg, 1989; Ryder, 1989; Daniels and 
Bekoff, 1990) and for millennia the fate of humans has been closely bound with 
that of animals. Indeed, early humans, members of a relatively weak species, 
had to use manipulative skills and reason in order to hunt and master (domesti-
cate) other animals who were larger, stronger, and faster (Cornwall, 1968). 
Since the industrial revolution humans have tended to live in greater isola-
tion from nature (Daniels and Bekoff, 1990). Populations have shifted to cities 
from rural areas, horsepowered transportation has been replaced by automobiles 
and other mechanical devices (that are nonetheless often rated in horsepower), 
and ticks and other parasites are about the only organisms that pose a serious 
threat to humans (with the exception of other humans). 
In the last half of the twentieth century, there has been increasing concern 
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about human relationships to nature. 1 This has manifested itself in obviously 
prudent ways (the mainstream environmental movement) and in ways that many 
humans find threatening (Earth First!, The Animal Liberation Front). Much of 
this activity has been fueled by scientific discovery and philm:ophical reflection. 
Although a great many uncertainties remain, we know vastly more now than we 
did a generation ago about the systemic characteristics of global systems and the 
interrelationships among seemingly unrelated components. In the light of this 
knowledge, a whole new branch of philosophical inquiry called "environmental 
ethics" has emerged along with its own journal of the same name (see also 
Regan, 1984; Rolston, 1988; Callicott, 1989; Nash, '1989). This work is becom-
ing increasingly influential on the environmental movement. 
The philosophical roots of the contemporary animal protection movement 
can be traced to Peter Singer's (1975), Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for our 
Treatment of Animals. Singer's volume literally changed lives and sparked a 
social movement. As Singer acknowledges, however, there had been a whole 
history of writing about human relationships with animals (see Ryder, 1989, and 
Phillips and Sechzer, 1989, for historical surveys), and many of Singer's argu-
ments were already presented in Henry Salt's (1892) Animals' Rights Considered 
in Relation to Social Progress. Animal Liberation itself grew out of Singer's 
review of Godlovitch and Harris' (1971); Animals, Men and Morals: An Inquiry 
into the Maltreatment of Non-Humans, in which the contributors essentially 
presented a manifesto demanding a change in human attitudes toward non-
humans. 
One important factor influencing the reception of Singer's book is that it 
appeared against the background of changing attitudes in philosophy, psycholo-
gy, and linguistics about the appropriateness of appeal to cognitive states in the 
explanation of human behavior. Chomsky's (1959) review of Skinner's Verbal 
Behavior was widely regarded as devastating to behaviorist attempts to explain 
human linguistic competence. Hilary Putnam's (1960/1975) discussion of the 
analogy between human mental states and the pr_9gram states of computers was 
also influential. Just as it is often appropriate to explain the behavior of a 
computer in terms of its program, so Putnam suggested it is reasonable to explain 
hum~n behavior by reference to mental states. By assimilating mentalistic lan-
guage- to the program states of a computer, Putnam suggested that we could be 
both mentalists and materialists. Fodor (1968) developed this insight into a 
program for psychology. By the 1970s the "cognitive revolution" was upon us. 
By the time Animal Liberation was published, behaviorism was dead in 
much of the intellectual world [sec Fletcher ( 1966) for a brief historical perspec-
!See Johnson (1984); Norton (1986); Stone (1987, 1988); Dombrowski (1988); Sagoff (1988a,b); 
Rolston (1988); Callicott (1989); McKibben (1989); Nash (1989); Terborgh (1989); and Westra 
(1989). 
,\: 
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tive]. It was no longer o,ut of the qu~stion for scientists to explain human behav-
ior in mentalistic terms: If the soCial lives of many animals were as complex as 
some researchers suggested (,and if there were no good theoretical reasons for 
eschewing talk of mental states,· then it seemed natural to explain animal behavior 
in mentalistic terms as well. 
Seen in this way the development of cognitive ethology was inevitable, and 
perhaps even tardy. In 1974, Thomas Nagel's provocative paper "What Is It Like 
to Be a Bat?'' appeared, and Animal Nature and Human Nature by W. H. Thorpe 
was published. E. 0. Wilson's (1975) influentiaitome, Sociobiology: The Mod-
ern Synthesis appeared, and at about the same time as Singer's work, and just one 
year later Donald Griffin's The Question of Animal Awareness: livolutionary 
Continuity of Mental Experience (1976, 1981) was published. Thus, in only two 
years students of animal behavior and philosophy_ were presented with what were 
seen as major new ideas in overlapping fields concerned with the comparative 
and evolutionary study of social behavior. 2 
Although Griffin's early discussions of the possible avenues ,9fmental con-
tinuity between humans and other animals were directed primarily at students of 
behavior, they served as bridges between a diverse group of scientists and philos-
ophers interested in ethics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind (see 
also Griffin, 1984). So, too, did Wilson's writings (Wilson, 1978). Furthermore, 
Griffin's influence on the field of anirpal behavior was enormous, partly because 
researchers were becoming increasingly a\Vare of their ethical responsibilities to 
animals, but also because of Griffin's stature in the scientific community. This 
was no junior laboratory-bound scientist looking to take on the world (Griffin, 
1985). 
The relation between ethology and philosophy is very clear in Animal Liber-
ation. Singer discusses research on animals at great length, and much of the 
discussion is negative and disapproving. According to Singer a great deal of 
scientific research on animals is immoral and cannot be justified. But in arguing 
that many animals are the objects of moral concern, Singer relies on ethological 
research by Jane Goodall, Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, and others that 
showed that animals have much more complex cognitive and social systems than 
were previously attributed to thein; especially by the behaviorist mainstream, and 
that they are capable of pleasure and pain. 3 Singer himself noted the irony that 
2WiJson's views met with diverse and often highly volatile negative responses; see, for example, 
Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People (1976); The Ann Arbor Science for the People 
Editorial Collective (1977); Ruse (1979); and Kitcher (1985). The sociopolitical consequences of 
sociobiology ("we are like them"; Allen, 1987) and cognitive ethology ("they are like us"; Allen, 
1987), fields which stress continuity between humans and other animals, is still being hotly debated 
(Midgley, 1978, 1983, 1985; Robinson, 1986; Allen, 1987; Richards, 1987; Barnett, 1988; 
Horigan, 1988; Paradis, 1989). 
3Current summaries and numerous examples of the cognitive abilities of diverse animals can be found 
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scientific research on animals has discovered features of animals such that, in 
virtue of them, a great deal of behavioral research cannot be justified.4 
Singer's contribution, in which ethological findings are considered along-
side philosophical principles, is one of many that have been made over the past 
two decades, authored or edited by students of behavior and philosophy alike.s 
More generally, philosophical work on various aspects of behavioral and evolu-
tionary biology6 and ecology7 has been received well in both camps. One result 
of this work, and more general inquiries in the philosophy of science (Kuhn, 
1969; Feyerabend, 1975, 1989; Laudan, 1989; Longino, 1989; Stevenson, 
1989), has been a convincing attack on the idea that science is value free. While 
ethologists have often regarded their research as objectively descriptive and 
explanatory, Rollin ( 1987, 1989a,b, 1990) has shown that this is false (see also 
Dennett, 1988; Haraway, 1989). Investigators bring with them a point of view 
that is difficult to shed even in the most impersonal endeavors. Values, commit-
ments, and presuppositions greatly influence our representations of what we are 
studying (Hacking, 1983, 1989; Bhaskar, 1989; Pawson, 1989, especially chap-
ter 7) and what we believe (Komblith, 1985). 
With respect to animal research, whether ethological, physiological, or 
biomedical, personal views and commitments about various issues, including 
animal rights, invariably color one's approach to the project athand. From their 
initiation, research projects reflect commitments and values that have consider-
able influence on the questions that are asked, their representation, and the 
interpretation, explanation, and use of the results. Often, no simple facts of the 
in Humphrey (1983, 1988); Griffin (1984)'; Jolly (1985, 1988); Oakley (l985a); Cheney et al. 
(1986); Else and Lee (1986); Mitchell and Thompson (1986); Blakemore and Greenfield (1987); 
Byrne and Whiten (1988); Weiskrantz (1988); Whiten and Byrne (1988); Montefiore and Noble 
(1989); Bekoff and Jamieson (l990a). 
4Caplan (1983) also noted that the recent accumulation of information showing the degree to which 
sentience and purposiveness permeate the animal kingdom raises doubts about continuing practices 
that harm or interfere with animals that may not differ all that much from human beings in the 
properties that count from a moral perspective. Alison Jolly, an experienced researcher in the 
behavior of nonhuman primates, has observed that a good deal of research on nonhuman primates 
was " ... based on a fallacy that primates other than ourselves are bodies without minds" (Jolly, 
1985, p. 238). A similar case cun e:!sily.he made for numerous other species. 
ssee, for example, Godlovitch and Harris Wl71); Midgl~y (1978, 1983); Singer (1979, 1981, 
1985a,b); Dawkins (1980, 1990); Rollin (1981, 1989a); Wood-Gush et al. (1981); Griffin (1982, 
1984); Jamieson and Regan (1982); Miller and Williams (1983); Rowan (1984); Regan (1982, 1983, 
1985, 1987); Jamieson (1985a,b, 1990); Blakemore and Greenfield (1987); Richards (1987); Sa· 
pontzis, (1987); Barnett (1988); McFarland (1989); Regan and Singer (1989); Rollin (1989a,b, 
1990); Montefiore and Noble (1989); Bekoff and Jamieson (l990a,b). 
6for recent contributions see Nagel (1979); Dennett (1983, 1987, 1989); Brandon and Burian (1984); 
Millikan (1984, 1989); Sober (1984, 1988); Depew and Weber (1985); Kitcher (1985); Rosenberg 
(1985); Mitchell and Thompson (1986); Murray (1986); Dupre (1987); Lloyd (1988); Ruse 
(l989a,b); Thompson (1989). 
7See Mcintosh (1985); Brennan (1988); Sagoff (l988a); Callicott (1989); Nash (1989). 
I' ' 
Reflective Ethology and Animal Welfare 7 
matter can be shown to favor one methodological approach over another. The 
basic questions, answers to which empirical research presuproses, arethem-
selves largely conceptual rather than empirical. 8 \ 
Ethology and philosophy should be seen as related areas that have much to 
offer each other. Ethological research is laced with value commitments that affect 
what research is done, how behavior is described, interpreted, and explained, 
and how results are evaluated. Philosophy, which involves reasoning about con-
cepts, needs empirical data to give it meaning and significance. Together, philos-
ophy and ethology can help us to understand human and animaiJ:~havior, and 
help us to assess the human place in nature. -/ 
\ 
IV. THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS 
The world in which the kestrel moves, the world that it sees, is, and will always be, entirely 
beyond us. That there are such worlds all around us is an essential feature of our world. 
Calling the bird's existence 'pointless' means only that it is not a device for any human end. 
(Midgley, 1978, p. 359) 
A. The Nature of Morality 
Before reviewing the arguments of those who have written about the moral 
status of animals, it is helpful to see how philosophers understand morality and 
moral philosophy. A good place to begin is with what Rachels ( 1986) calls the 
"minimum conception of morality." According to Rachels, "morality is, at the 
very least, the effort to guide one's conduct by reason-that is, to do what there 
are the best reasons for doing-while giving equal weight to the interests of each 
individual who will be affected by one's conduct." (p. 11)9 
There are other views about the ultimate nature of morality, ranging from 
the position that moral language is just the expression of subjective states (Mack-
ie, 1977) to the stance that there are objective moral properties to which moral 
language refers (Brink, 1989). Whatever their differences on this issue, hov/ever, 
BJn ethological research one can contrast modes of interpretation and explanation by reductionists 
who represent data using flowcharts depicting hierarchical motivational systems, state functions, 
homeostatic processes, or reflexes (for numerous examples, see McFarland, 1985, 1989) and those 
who take an intentional stance (Dennett, 1983, 1987; see reference's in footnote' 3, p. 5). 
9'fhis account of morality does not tell us why we should be moral. This is an important and difficult 
question, and many different responses have been given. Williams (1972) has argued that the 
consistent amoralist is not an attractive figure; indeed, he or she is a sociopath. The question for 
most of us is not whether to be moral in general, but whether to do what we ought to do on a 
particular occasion. 
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most philosophers agree that moral reasoning is in some sense objective, and that 
the methods of logic and rational persuasion permit progress in moral discussion. 
Many scientists do not share this view. They often speak as if morality is 
subjective and that rational considerations are not relevant to moral beliefs. It is 
striking, however, that ordinary people, and scientists when they are behaving 
like ordinary people, discuss moral issues as if there were some point to doing 
so. They give arguments and try to persuade people of conclusions on rational 
grounds. Seen in this light, radical subjectivism appears to be the product of 
positivist ideology rather than of common sense (Macintyre, 1981; Hacking, 
1983; Jamieson, 1986). 
Whatever the ultimate basis of ethical norms, philosophers characteris-
tically think of morality as something about which we can reason. Since, as 
Rachels (1986) points out, morality is in some sense impartial, what one person 
ought to do should concern others who may be in a relevantly similar position. 
And since various institutions, policies, and practices affect human and animal 
welfare, morality is a public matter. 
It is consistent with the view that morality is in some sense rational that it is 
often difficult to determine what morality demands, and that reasonable people 
may disagree. Moral disagreement or condemnation is not a form of insult; it 
reflects competing views of what morality requires (Clark, 1987). But from the 
fact that people may disagree about morality, it does not follow that there is no 
fact of the matter. Just as people may disagree or be misguided about scientific 
facts, so people can disagree or be confused about moral facts. 
B. Rights and Obligations 
Philosophers draw precise distinctions between such terms as "rights" and 
"obligations." In order to appreciate the philosophical literature concerning the 
moral status of animals, it· is important to be cognizant of these distinctions. 
First, philosophers distinguish between legal rights and obligations and 
moral rights and obligations. Many philosophers believe that there is a nor-
mative structure that may or may not be recognized in positive law. Indeed, on 
some views, it is reference to·this underlying normative structure that justifies 
particular systems of law. The gratuitous torture of an innocent creature, for 
example, may be a violation of moral rights ev:;-n if this torture is sanctioned by 
the law of a legally constituted government. 
Second, philosophers distinguish between positive and negative rights. A 
positive right is "a right to other people's positive actions; a negative right is a 
right to other persons' omissions or forbearances" (Feinberg, 1973, p. 59). For 
example, a right to life, understood as a right not to be unjustly killed, would be a 
negative right; when understood as a right to be provided with the means to life, 
it is a positive right. 
Reflective Ethology and Animal Welfare ~ 
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Not all philosophers believe in moral rights. But if an individual has moral 
rights, then there are some harms that others may not impos-e-on this individual 
(negative rights), or there are some benefits to which, this individual is entitled 
(positive rights). 
The main function of rights on most views is to provide a sphere of protec-
tion around individuals tha:t cannot justifiably be violated. Consider an example 
inspired by Harris (1975). Suppose that you are a physician and you arrive alone 
at the site of a plane crash. There are five victims, all unconscious. If you 
provide standard medical treatment, one will live and four-will die. The four will· ', 
die because each is in need of an organ: two need kldneys'lmd two need lungs. 
Suppose that you have two options. One option is to undertake standard medical 
treatment that would result in one person surviving and four persons dying. The 
other option maximizes utility; it is to distribute the organs, from the one who 
would survive to the others who are in need. Choosing this option would save 
four lives at the cost of one. What should you do? 
Most people believe that it would be wrong to save the four. They believe 
this because they think that it would be wrong to kill the person who would 
survive in order to save other people. It is this sort of intuition on which theories 
of rights are based. Most people believe that saving the four would involve a 
violation of the rights of the one, and that rights cannot be violated even if the 
consequences of doing so would be good. . _ / 
If there are moral rights, then their function is to protectl_1_1di~iduals from 
utility maximizing. To have a right to life or a right to be spared suffering is to be 
entitled to moral protection even if the consequences would be better overall if 
the right were violated. 
Rights entail obligations, but obligations do not entail rights. If Sean has a 
right to life, then others have an obligation not to kill Sean. It is important to see, 
however, that individuals may have obligations even where there are no rights. 
For example, we may have obligations to contribute to charity, even though the 
recipients of our charity may have no right to demand it. 
Questions about the "logic" of rights and obligations become technical and 
complex very quickly, and a large literature is devoted to these questions (for a 
bibliography, see Martin and Nickel, 1983; Nickel, 1990). For our purposes, 
what is important to see is that if individuals have rights, then they are morally 
protected from violations even if the overall consequences of violating their 
rights would be good; and that even if individuals do not have rights, we may still 
have obligations to them. 
C. Animal Welfare Ethics 
Employing this vocabulary of rights and obligations, Singer (1975) and 
Regan (1983) have powerfully argued that human behavior toward other animals 
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is often grossly immoral. Regan has claimed that some nonhumans have basic 
rights for the same reasons as humans. According to Regan, it is the inherent 
value of individuals that generates moral rights, and the same reasons that we 
have for thinking that humans have inherent value also apply to nonhumans (for 
further discussion and critique see Jamieson, 1990). On this view, nonhuman 
animals have value quite apart from any human interests; they are sentient, they 
exhibit fear and hope, they have preferences, and they pursue goals. 
Singer denies that animals have rights, but then he also denies that humans 
have rights. Singer is a utilitarian (for reviews, see Smart and Williams, 1973; 
Quinton, 1988). The classical version of this view, which is a form of consequen-
tialism, states that "an action is right if it produces as much or more of an 
increase in the happiness of all affected by it than any alternative action, and 
wrong if it does not" (Singer, 1979, p. 3). Singer (1979, pp. 12-13) modifies the 
classical view of utilitarianism by saying that the right course of action is the one 
that has the "best consequences, on balance, for all affected," where " 'best 
consequences' is understood as meaning what, on balance, furthers the interests 
[our emphasis] of those affected, rather than merely what increases pleasure and 
reduces pain." Singer argues that the interests of sentient nonhumans are worthy 
of equal consideration with those of humans, and that humans and many non-
humans have an interest in avoiding suffering. The utilitarian approach may be 
less restrictive than the rights approach in terms of what humans are permitted to 
do to animals, but there is some disagreement about this (Regan, 1985; Singer, 
1985a,b). 
Midgley ( 1983), Rollin (1981 ), and Sapontzis (1987) have also argued that 
much of our treatment of nonhuman animals is immoral. These philosophers 
believe that humans systematically mistreat nonhumans in ways that are morally 
objectionable, but not all of them believe in moral rights. Midgley believes that 
our exclusion of animals from the moral community is both a result of, and 
contributes to, bad character. Along the way she makes many subtle remarks 
about cultun11 attitudes toward animals, women, and science. Rollin argues that 
humans have rights because they pursue ends. Since other animals also pursue 
ends, they have moral rights as well. Sapontzis emphasizes the continuity of the 
animal rights position with commonsense morality. He suggests that the animal 
rights position would seem obvious to us were we not:····ectucated" to accept 
indefensible and arbitrary limitations on the applications of our moral concepts. 
The literature on animal rights is rich, diverse, and in many cases quite 
systematic. We cannot do justice to it in a brief review. What is interesting is that 
much of this work is written from very different philosophical perspectives. 
Utilitarians such as Singer, rights theorists such as Regan, neo-Aristotelians such 
as Rollin and Midgley, and intuitionists such as Sapontzis, all converge on the 
conclusion that we systematically treat animals in ways that are grossly immoral. 
As impressive as some of these works are individually, the cumulative effect of 
, ______ , ____ _ 
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these arguments, whose conclusions are invariant with respect to many different 
theoretical assumptions, is more powerful still. In this cas6 the sum is greate~ { 
than the parts. > 
V. RESISTANCE TO REFORM 
[C]himps, lacking language entirely so far as we know, are richly endowed with cognition and 
intelligence by any meaning of the term. (S. J. Gould, 1988, p. 332) 
Anything a chimp can do, a dog can do better, or at least as well. (Sasha's dictum, 
unpublished) 
Much of the resistance to the ideas of the animal ph>tection movement is 
personal and cultural, rooted in self-interest and prejudice rather than in rational 
argument. We are in a period in which attitudes and value systems are undergo-
ing dramatic change, and movements for social change generally stimulate their 
own resistance. In addition to this kind of resistance, however, there is also 
principled resistance. Some of this is moral in that it may accept the idea that 
animals are more like us than we might have imagined, but denies that we have 
obligations to them. Other opposition involves denying that animals have cog-
nitive and affective lives that are worth taking seriously. We will di~cuss these 
views in tum. 
A. Moral Resistance 
Moral resistance to the animal rights movements comes from moral human-
ists, moral democrats, and moral privatists (Jamieson, 1985a). 
Moral humanists agree that there are serious moral issues iti~olved in animal 
experimentation, but they claim that morality is on the side of unrestricted animal 
research. Two different lines of argument have been given for such a position. 
One line of argument tries to identify a crucial moral criterion that can 
exclude animals from the ambit of moral concern. It is then argued that although 
animals may have rich affective and cognitive lives, these features are morally 
irrelevant. On this view animals may suffer, but their suffering is without moral 
significance. This line of argument has been urged by some, but not all, philoso-
phers who are contractarians (e.g., Narveson, 1977, 1983; Gauthier, 1983; cf. 
Rawls, 1971). Contractarians see morality as rooted in a system of agreements. 1 
Since animals are not party to the agreements that establish morality, nothing we 
do to them can be regarded as wrong. There are many problems with this view 
(Regan, 1977; Jamieson, 1981), but the most obvious one is that it purchases a 
principled ,il}difference to the fate of animals at the price of indifference to the 
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fate of many humans, namely, infants, future generations, the mentally disabled, 
and perhaps even those who are regarded as morally, mentally, or racially in~ 
ferior. Ironically, however, contractarian morality actually has potential for re~ 
ducing the number of animals used in research. For if some humans are beyond 
the ambit of morality, then there is no moral objection to using them in bio~ 
medical research. Furthermore, there are strong reasons for doing so: the best 
model of a human is another human. 
A second line of argument given by moral humanists admits that animals 
may matter morally, but maintains that such important values are at stake on the 
other side of the issue that unrestricted animal research is the most acceptable 
policy from the moral point of view. The most prominent advocate of this view is 
Cohen ( 1977, 1978, 1986). 10 Cohen has mentioned several values in passing that 
are supposed always to trump animal welfare, but the one that features most 
prominently in his argument is freedom of inquiry. It is implausible, however, on 
the face of it to suppose that freedom of inquiry should always take precedence 
over other values. We certainly do not suppose this when human welfare is at 
stake. But not enough attention has been paid to the question of why freedom of 
inquiry is valuable, and in particular, why knowledge is important (Midgley, 
1989). (This is a theme to which we will return in the concluding section.) 
The most fundamental problem with many of the arguments given by moral 
humanists is that they beg the question. They are introduced in order to show 
why animals do not matter, but in many cases the argument simply assumes that 
animals do not matter rather than establishing it. Of course it is difficult to say 
how to resolve conflicts between the interests of humans and animals (and 
humans and humans, and animals and animals). Reasonable people may have 
different views about this. What is implausible, and what the moral humanists 
fail to show, is that the interests of Homo sapiens should always take precedence 
over the interests of members of other species. 
Moral democrats recognize that there is a deep and serious division in our 
society about how animals may be treated in scientific contexts, and they seek to 
compromise this division (Moss, 1984). While the goals of some moral demo~ 
crats may be laudable-the reduction or elimination of unjustified animal re~ 
search and a defense of what is truly imp(),rtant-the problem is that they misun~ 
derstand morality and the nature of moral conflict. They treat moral principles 
IOWoolsey (1988, p. 1200) cites Cohen (1986) as an example in which Singer's and Regan's "philo-
sophical views have been scrutinized by professional philosophers who find 'animal rights' and 
'animal liberation' seriously flawed in logic, assumptions, and conclusions ... It is evident that 
after the hype is cleared away the goals are political." Contrary to the neurobiologist Woolsey, 
many philosophers from different theoretical perspectives agree with Singer's and Regan's conclu-
sions, and their work is important enough to be the subject of doctoral dissertations. It is interesting 
that Cohen's attack on Singer and Regan was not published in a philosophy journal, but in a journal 
whose readers are untrained in philosophy. This periodical was also unwilling to publish any 
response (P. Singer, personal communication). For a devastating critique of Cohen's views, see 
Hettinger (1989). 
ReOective Ethology and Animal Welfare 13 
and commitments as mere preferences that can be compromised for the sake of 
conflict resolution. As long as they systematically devalue moral discourse, their 
attempts at compromise will not really engage with the claims_imd arg'uments of 
the animal welfare theorists. . , ' 
Moral privatists view morality as concerning only private stances on funda-
mentally private issues. They misunderstand morality so thoroughly that their 
views seem scarcely to be moral views. They do not see issues about the regula-
tion and use of animals in research as moral issues at all. They often see them-
selves as victims of animals liberationists who do not understand science or 
recognize its authority. "Animal crazies" are simply out to harass 'tne~ ~ild to 
disrupt their work. In their view it is each person's business how he or she t~eats 
animals. 11 \ 
In the end, none of these responses engage successfully with the animal 
protection theorists. The humanist can be seen as someone who has moral prin-
ciples that are not successfully defended, and the democrat as someone who 
misunderstands the force and authority of moral principles. The privatist's mis-
understanding of the nature of morality and the force of moral reasons is so 
thorough that it seems an appropriate object of diagnosis and therapy rather than 
of argument. 
B. Resistance to Cognitivism and Intentionalism 
An evolutionary approach to the study of mind stresses that comparative 
analyses of cognition should concentrate on viewing behavior patterns and men-
tal states as "structures" or phenotypes that an organism "has" or "does," and 
that both are subject to natural selection just as any other phenotype (Darwin, 
1871; Schiller, 1957; Bekoff and Jamieson, 1990b). Evolutionary studies of 
cognition should focus on questions such as: "Why have specific mental abilities 
(and perhaps associated structures) evolved?" "What are possible adaptive ad-
vantages associated with behavior patterns that are explained most readily by 
assuming the use of cognitive skills?" "What makes us and other species 
unique?" and "How do individuals vary in the performance of cognitive ac-
tivities and does this variation influence reproductive activities?" 
Issues about animal minds are among the most difficult confronting eth-
ologists, comparative psychologists, and philosophers. 12 In general, data col-
lected on captive animals and from field observations indicate that the "intellec-
- l 
liHorton (1989, pp. 741-742) believes that scientists who take a moral privatist's stance are an 
"extinct species" that has "no standing in the scientific community"; but see Woolsey (1988). 
I2For comparative and interdisciplinary discussions, see Searle (1983); Roitblat eta/. (1984); Mat-
thews (1985); Oakley (1985a); Else and Lee (1986); Kalikow (1987); Dunbar (1988); Kamil 
(1988); Bonner (1989); Chisholm (1989); Montefiore and Noble (1989); Silvers (1989); Bekoffand 
Jamieson (1990a). · 
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tual capacities of animals are greater thim previously thought" (Kamil, 1988, p. 
300; see also Darwin, 1871). There is still sharp disagreement, however, con-
cerning the structures and capacities of animal minds (Colgan, 1989; McCleery, 
1989). Where to "draw the line" concerning the presence of absence of minds 
also is problematic (see, for example, Matthews, 1985; Silvers, 1989). Nonethe-
less, many philosophers and ethologists, including us, believe that at least mam-
mals, especially weaned individuals 13: 
1. are intelllgent (Jerison and Jerison, 1988; Kamil, 1988; see also Macphail, 
1987); 
2. are conscious (in that they often are awake, aware of their environment, and 
able to respond to changes in internal and surrounding conditions); 
3. are able to, and do, engage in intentional activities of varying orders of 
complexity (Beck, 1980; Dennett, 1983, 1987, 1989; Griffin, 1984; Mitchell 
and Thompson, 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986; Byrne and Whiten, 1988; de 
Waal, 1989; Montefiore and Noble, 1989; Wynn, 1989, 1990; some of the 
best examples seem to come from research on mammalian social play behav-
ior: Bekoff, 1975, 1978; Bekoff and Byers, 1981; Fagen, 1981; Mitchell, 
1990; but see Rosenberg, 1990); 
4. have expectations, desires, and beliefs (Jeffrey, 1985; Rollin, 1989a); 
5. make assessments and choices based on their abilities to make fine discrimi-
nations among other individuals (Burley, 1981; Bateson, 1983, 1990; Oakley, 
1985a; Byers and Bekoff, 1986; Cheney et al., 1986; Blaustein et al., 1987; 
Fletcher and Michener, 1987; Power, 1989; see also Grafen, 1989; Blaustein 
et al., 1990); 
6. have subjective feelings (Darwin, 1872; Nagel, 1974; Oatley, 1989; Bekoff 
and Jamieso~, 1990a; Dawkins, 1990; Singer, 1990). 
Various researchers have even proposed that some social mammalian spe-
cies are composed of "natural psychologists" who use their own feelings to 
model those of others and are therefore self-aware (Humphrey, 1983; see also 
Wood-Gush et al., 1981; Cheney et al., 1986; Power, 1989). In addition, data are 
also available for other animal groups, including insects, that might suggest that 
they are conscious, or hay(: _highly sophisticated "cognitive engines." 14 
Bfor comparative data on cognition in a~Tmals other than mammals, see Darwin (1871); Burley 
(1981, 1986); Wyers (1985); Campan et al. (1987); Kamil (1988); Zentall and Galef (1988); 
Pepperberg (1988, 1989, Chapter 4, this volume); Gould ~nd Gould (1988); Gould and Towne 
(1989). Seeley (1989) writes of honey bees "knowing" about the nature of their food supply. 
Dickinson (1988) notes that even simple instrumental conditioning may support an intentional 
interpretation and be a primitive marker of cognition. 
14Gould and Gould (1982) wrote that we invoke consciousness out of explanatory desperation, and 
with respect to their elegant research on bee dance language, they concluded that insects are good 
examples of the power of blind behavioral programming; but J. L. Gould (Gould and Towne, I 989; 
see also Gould and Gould, 1988) now believes that bees, like "higher" animals (Walker, 1983; 
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Discussions of animal minds often founder on the question of con-
sciousness. Comparative, historical, and conceptual discussions o(the notion of 
consciousness abound in the literature 15 and there -seems to be almost as many 
definitions as there are writers (Oakley, 1985b; see·also Gregory, 1987, pp. 160-
166). It may be, as some have suggested, that the concept of consciousness is not 
a helpful one for thinking about either humans or animals (Ryle,- 1967/1971; 
Dupre, 1990). For there may be no more to consciousness than having conscious 
mental states, and it may be that these are had by any organism who has 
sensations (McGinn, 1982). Whatever is true about consciousness, we think that 
it is clear that many animals are conscious in thaf'they/ar~ aware of th~ir 
surroundings and able to modify their behavior through ·awaren'ess of changing 
stimuli (adaptive versatility: Griffin, 1984). 
Questions about the existence and nature of nonhuman mental states and 
how they may be compared with those of humans are important ones that may 
influence our views about whether we have any moral obligation to concern 
ourselves with their well-being. As we have suggested, discoveries in ethology 
(cognitive and otherwise) have had direct and significant influences on how 
many people think about the moral status of animals. At the same time it is 
important to note that one cannot immediately move from views about animal 
minds to views about the moral status of animals. Some important inferential 
connection must be established between them, and this requires argument. Ristau 
(1983) and Singer (1975) [following Bentham (1789/1948, p. 311))-believe that 
the fundamental question "is not Can they reason? nor Can they-talk rut, Can 
they suffer?" Indeed, Davidson (1985), a philosopher who denies that animals 
can think, remarks parenthetically that "I see no reason to be Jess kind to those 
without thoughts or language than to those with; on the contrary" (p. 474). 
Most of those who deny that animals have minds are not as subtle as 
Davidson. They move quickly from the denial of animal minds to the assertion 
that animals are not the proper objects of moral concern. For example, Carruthers 
Boesch and Boesch, 1984; Sigg, 1986; Speakman, 1987; Rosenzweig, 1990) may have "cognitive 
maps" (but see Wehner and Menzel, 1990). 
I5See Fuller (1949); Farrell (1950); Thorpe (1974); Griffin (1982, 1984); Sprigge (1982); Walker 
(1983); Burghardt (1985); O'Shaughnessy (1986); Rosenthal (1986); Zemach (1986); Jackendoff 
(1987); Lycan (1987); Glover (1988); Marcel and Bisiach (1988); Edelman (1989); Rollin (1989a, 
1990); Blackmore (1989); Lloyd (1989); Lockwood (1989); Maudlin (1989); Radner and Radner 
(1989); Rose (1989); Clark (1990). With respect to arguments about consciousness in humans 
versus nonhumans, Rollin (1989a, 1990) presents a useful discussion of how Lloyd Morgan's 
Canon (law of parsimony) has been misinterpreted,by people wishing to deny consciousness in 
animals. Jackendoff (1987, p. 325) interestingly notes that "Consbiousncss has proven not to be an 
especially high-level process, as everyone has always wanted it to be. In particular, it is not what 
makes us human. Rather, if we assume that evolutionary continuity in the computational mind 
parallels (and is derived from) evolutionary continuity in the form of the body, it follows that the 
higher animals have levels of representation something like ours." 
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(1989) denies that animals have conscious experiences and immediately goes on 
to claim that the sympathy that many people have for animals is "morally 
objectionable" ( p. 268). We shall discuss his views in detail. 
1. Carruthers On Nonconscious Experience 
In a recent article Carruthers (1989, p. 269) has argued that "in the case of 
brutes: since their pains are nonconscious (as are all their mental states), they 
ought not be allowed to get in the way of any morally-serious objective." As will 
be obvious in this section, we believe that Carruthers' argument involves the 
misuse of scientific data, fallacious reasoning, and false premises. Still, Car-
ruthers does give an argument that is not based on religious dogma (unlike, for 
example, the Committee on the Use of Animals in Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research of the National Research Council, 1988; but see Christine Steven's 
concluding comments, pp. 84-87), and this serves to separate him from many 
people who believe that animals are not worthy of moral concern. 
Carruthers begins by arguing from example that there are nonconscious 
experiences as well as conscious ones. Two of his examples of nonconscious 
experience are drawn from ordinary life: steering around a double-parked lorry 
while fantasizing about next summer's holiday and placing a glass between two 
coffee 'mugs while distractedly doing dishes. These are complex actions that 
require considerable visual discrimination, yet according to Carruthers they may 
be performed without conscious awareness of the lorry or the mugs (or presum-
ably anything else). The third example is that of blindsight, cases in which. 
subjects claim to see nothing in an area of their visual field, yet can move their 
hands or eyes to a correct position when a stimulus is presented in that part of the 
visual field (Weiskrantz et al., 1974; Schacter et al., 1988). Carruthers claims 
that such nonconscious experiences "do not feel like anything"; they have no 
"subjective feel" (1989, p. 258). 
The difference between conscious and nonconscious mental states, accord-
ing to Carruthers, is that conscious mental states are "available to conscious 
thought" (p. 262). Since "no one would seriously maintain that dogs, cats, 
sheep, cattle, pigs, or chickens consciously thinkthings!o themselves" (p. 265). 
it follows that the experience of most animals is noncons-cious.But since only 
conscious experience is morally significant, the experience of most animals is 
without moral significance. Hence even the most trivial human interest should 
take precedence over the interests of animals, and we should seek to eradicate 
our feelings of sympathy for animals. 
One novel feature of Carruthers' account is that in one sense he does not 
deny that animals have minds. It is consistent with his view that animals have 
beliefs, desires, and intentions, and are subject to episodes of pain and pleasure. 
--------...... 
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His claim is that even if animals have such experiences, they are without moral 
significance because they are nonconscious. 1 : 
Carruthers' language is perverse. It would be clearer to say that he denie{ 
that animals have experiences. The attribution of experiences to creatures that are 
nonconscious would seem to be metaphorical extension-like referring to cam-
eras that see and gauges that have beliefs. But however the claims are cast, the 
main objections to Carruthers' views are not linguistic. 
Carruthers' examples do not show what he wants them to show. The first 
two examples are cases of selective attention, and it is not clear that they are 
cases of nonconscious experience at all. The criterion he gives for identifying 
these cases as ones of nonconscious experience is failure of memory. The driver's 
experience of steering around the double-parked lorry is nonconscious because 
he does not remember doing it. But failing to remember an experience is not a 
reliable criterion for the experience's being nonconscious. Most of us forget 
many of our experiences, and patients with "amnesic syndrome" (Weiskrantz, 
1987) remember almost nothing of their experience. The inference from failure 
of memory to an experience's being nonconscious is just plain fallacious. 
Blindsight is very different from Carruthers' other examples. It should be 
noted first that the blindsight phenomenon is very controversial (Gazzaniga, 
1985; Jackendoff, 1987). Some researchers have not been able to confirm its 
existence (Gazzaniga, 1985), others have claimed that it is an artifact of stray 
light in subjects' environments, and it has also been pointed out that the lesions 
that are supposed to be associated with blindsight have not been located with any 
confidence (Campion et al., 1983). Moreover, Weiskrantz himself draws very 
different conclusions about consciousness from the blindsight phenomenon than 
does Carruthers (Weiskrantz, 1987). Weiskrantz identifies "monitoring" with 
consciousness, and he believes that we monitor some of what we do but not all of 
it. The question about animals, according to Weiskrantz, is whether they ever 
"monitor" their experiences. He thinks that many do and cites research that "in 
effect allowed laboratory rats to do what they like, and then.asked them if they 
knew what they were doing" (Weiskrantz, 1987, p. 317). His interpretation of 
this research is that laboratory rats sometimes do know what they are doing. Like 
humans, they "monitor" some of what they do and are therefore conscious. 
In any event, Carruthers' examples should shed very little light on whether 
animals are conscious. Even if we accept his dubious interpretations of these 
examples and also grant that these experiences "do not feel like anything," !6 it 
still may be the case that the possibility of nonconscious experience depends on 
an organism's conscious experiences. From the fact that an organism (for exam-
ple, a human) that has conscious experiences also has nonconscious ones, it does 
16Wci~krantz (1987, p. 314) reports that some patients with blindsight have "a 'feeling' that some-
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not follow that there may be organisms for whom all experiences are non-
conscious. 
There is also a difficulty with Carruthers' definition of conscious mental 
states as mental states that are "available to conscious thought" (1989, p. 262). 
This definition is obviously circular, for the term that is defined occurs in the 
definition. In order to have a conscious mental state it must be possible for one to 
have a conscious thought about that mental state. But in order for the second-order 
thought to be conscious, it must be possible for one to have a conscious thought 
about that, and. so on, ad infinitum. Since the definition of "conscious mental 
state" that Carruthers gives is circular, it is not clear what conscious mental states 
are or how it is possible for anyone to have them. 
To these objections we could add more. For example, the distinction be-
tween conscious and nonconscious experience may be a false dichotomy. In 
collapsing blindsight, nonconscious experience, and inattention Carruthers may 
be guilty of the fallacy of equivocation. Nor is it obvious that nonconscious 
experiences should be regarded as utterly without moral significance (Nagel, 
197011979). 
Carruthers' careless use of the blindsight data is consistent with his earlier 
admissions (apparently not remedied when he wrote "Brute Experience") that he 
has little training in the behavioral sciences (Carruthers, 1986, p. 235) and that 
he has not made an attempt to survey the details of available evidence (p. 240). 
Our general thesis in this chapter is that ethology and philosophy are important 
complements to each other. Carruthers' can(n)on, which blows up under pres-
sure, should be a warning to philosophers who write about animals while ne-
glecting or misusing scientific data. 
2. · Mind and Language 
Over the years many criteria have been introduced for distinguishing hu-
mans from other animals. These include tool use (Beck, 1980; Chevalier-
Skolnikoff, 1989; Bekoff, 1989b; see also Wynn, 1989, 1990), tool production 
(Beck, 1980), art (Dissanayake, 1988), altruistic behavior, and communicati_'{e 
ability. One by one these criteria have been shown to fail: they do not pick out all 
and only humans. 
Nowadays the most cornmon _criterion that is invoked for distinguishing 
humans from other animals is linguistic competence (Bennett, 1964; Chomsky, 
1966; Descartes, 164411970). Language is regarded as crucial because it is 
thought to be related to the possibility of having thoughts (Davidson, 1975) or to 
the possibility of self-consciousness (Malcolm, 1972-1973). This linguistic cri-
terion may well be in the background of Carruthers' position. He "presumes that 
the pains of babies, too, are nonconscious," for "no one will seriously maintain 
that they consciously think things to themselves" (1989, p. 269). Although 
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Carruthers doesn't say what the "things" are that babies and animals do not think 
to themselves, one suspects that they are words; 
Davidson's (1975, 1985) treatment is the most sophisticated contemporary 
account of the linguistic criterion as that which distinguish~s humans from other 
animals·. He claims that in order to think, a creature must have a full range of 
"propositional attitudes": beliefs, desires, fears, hopes, for exa'mple. Having 
propositional attitudes in turn rests on having a language. There seem to be two 
reasons why Davidson thinks that this is so: first, language is required in order 
for a belief to have content and identity; and second, one must be able to have 
beliefs about beliefs if one is to have beliefs at all. 
A number of philosophers have taken issue with Davidson's argument (Rou-
tley, 1981; Jeffrey, 1985; Crisp, 1990; Dupre, 1990). The issu~s- are quite com-
plex, and we shall limit ourselves to a few observations. \ 
\ 
First, with respect to the second point (the necessity of having beliefs about 
beliefs), it is not at all clear that the possibility of first-order belief turns on the 
possibility of second-order belief. Davidson appears to think that having a belief 
involves the possibility of surprise. If I believe that P, then I would be surprised 
to discover that not P (-P). If I am surprised to discover that - P,. then I come to 
believe that my original belief was false. This involves having the second-order 
belief that my first-order belief was false, which involves having the concept of 
beliefP 
As far as we are concerned, many animals may well have second-order . · 
beliefs. We do not believe that this is as absurd as many philosophers arid 
scientists seem to think. But even if animals do not have second-order b'eliefs, 
there is no reason why an animal could not discover that a beli~f was f~lse. F~r 
example, Sasha believes that her bone is in the doghouse. She looks, and dis-
covers that it is not. Discovering the surprising fact that the bone is not in the 
doghouse constitutes Sasha's discovering that her belief is false. Sasha is sur-
prised that her bone is not in her doghouse (she expected it to be there because 
she placed it there previously). Expressed this way, Sasha's discovery that her 
belief is false makes no essential reference to the correction of her belief, but 
only to her expectations and the state 'of the world. 
Second, it would seem that we can make some distinctions that Davidson, 
for his own theoretical reasons, does not. For example, we can distinguish the 
question of whether Gretta (the dog) has a belief from the question of whether 
Gretta's belief is the same as ours. And we can distinguish both of these from the 
question of how to identify and give content to Gretta's belief. Once we have 
made these distinctions, it would seem plausible to suppose that Gretta and Sasha 
have beliefs about bones even though these are not the same as our beliefs about 
I 
I7See Tinklepaugh's (1928) observations of apparent surprise in monkeys when an expected and 
favored food item was replaced with lettuce. 
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bones, and even though we may not be able to give determinate content to 
Gretta's and Sasha's beliefs (Regan, 1983; Dupre, 1990). 
It may be plausible to suppose that thought requires representation, bUt 
representation may not involve language. Bennett (1976), Millikan (1984), 
Hom (1988), Herman and Morrel-Samuels (1990) all suppose that animals have 
nonlinguistic representations (see also Weiskrantz, 1988). The failure to repre-
sent linguistically may affect or even limit the beliefs and desires of language-
less creatures, but it is hard to see why it should prevent them from having beliefs 
and desires altogether, or\from using cognitive maps (Griffin, 1976, 1984; 
Walker, 1983; Roberts, 1984; Sigg, 1986; Premack, 1988; Gould and Towne, 
1989). 
It is possible to take many other positions with respect to the relation 
between thought and language. Ryle (1949, 196711971) disputed the very idea 
that there is any single thing called "thinking" of which we could give an 
account. He heaped scorn particularly on the idea that all thinking involves 
symbol manipulation, and even objected to the idea that thinking involves an 
"organized procession" of contents before the mind (p. 465). Dennett 
(1975/1978) and Churchland (1986) have also expressed skepticism about the 
"symbol manipulation" model of thought. 
We should also consider the possibility that other animals have minds but 
that we may never be in a position to appreciate them (Midgley, 1978). Gustafson 
(1986, p. 180) may have suggested this when he wrote that "we seem to have no 
idea at all what the life of the animal is like to the animal itself." Nagel (1979, P· 
175) points out that "if there is some conscious life elsewhere in the universe it is 
likely that some of it will not be describable even in the most general experiential 
terms available to us." Indeed, even trying to understand animal minds on the 
model of our own minds may seriously distort the character of their mental life 
(Wasserman, 1984; Dupre, 1990; Rollin, 1990). 
3. The Problem of Other Minds 
One form of resistance to cognitivism and intentionalism, especially among 
scientists, involves the philosophical problem about other minds. Philosophical 
skeptics about the possibility ofk:J!owledge have sometimes illicitly inferred that 
we could always be wrong about the mental states of others from the undeniable 
fact that we are sometimes wrong. Another tri~k:''often used by skeptics about 
animal minds, is to pitch the criteria of knowledge so hi!¥that it opens a wedge 
for skepticism. For example, Frey (1980) claims that we cannot attribute beliefs 
to animals because no behavior ever conclusively establishes that an animal has a 
particular belief, and because human observers can never directly perceive ani-
mal beliefs. McGinn (1980, p. 865) points out that "with the requirements 
pitched this high, not even professors of philosophy can be credited with 
beliefs." 
Reflective Ethology and Anlmal Welfare 21 
-----
We should apply the same standards for knowledge of questions about 
animal minds that we apply to questions about human minds. If standards were 
consistently applied, skeptics about one likely would be skeptics about the other. 
Of course, it is true that the possibilities of error when identifying mental states 
are probably greater in the case of animals than humans (Dupre, 1990). It ~~y 
generally be true that the more culturally, morphologically, and physiologically· 
remote creatures are from us, the more likely we are to go wrong in our identifi-
cations. Most Americans are probably better at identifying the mental states of 
their countrymen than they are of Japanese. However, we should avoid confusing 
our failure to determine what mental state a creature has with the question of 
whether the creature has any mental states at all. ·"" /\ 
We conclude this section maintaining that while humans and animals-are -
different, there are also large variations among animals and in many instances 
these differences are far greater than those between, say, humans and other 
primates (Goodall, 1987). Furthermore, there -are also large differences among 
humans. Before we discard the idea that at least some animals can reflect on their 
own mental states, have beliefs, and engage in rich intentional behavior, we need 
to consider available data that at worst are inconclusive and at best strongly 
indicate that at least some animals resemble humans very closely in their cog-
nitive skills and in their abilities to suffer and to experience pain. As Jeffrey 
(1985, p. 487) wrote: "I can't prove that lions f~el pain. I can't prove that you do 
either. But in both cases I cannot doubt it." Incomplete data sets and imperfect 
inferences should not be used as excuses to 'underestimate the' capacities of 
animals. The overwhelming probability that animal minds exist;- though .they 
may be difficult to study, cannot plausibly be denied (Griffin, 1984). Perhaps 
Routley (1981, p. 410) sums up the situation most adequately: 
The refusal to apply beliefs predicates to nonhumans results in a serious impoverishment of 
discourse and description; it leaves us in the position of having no adequate way of describing 
many situations which arise; it robs us of the natural way of describing and explaining many 
situations but proposes no adequate substitute. 
-~·-·· 
VI. COMMON SENSE RESTORED: TOWARD A RIGOROUS, 
MODERATE, AND PRAGMATIC VIEW OF ANIMAL 
RESEARCH 
[l]t is clear that since the Middle Ages the growth in popularity of companion animals has 
been inextricably linked with the decline of anthropocentrism, and the gradual development 
of a more egalitarian approach to animals and the natural world. (Serpell, 1986, p. 135) 
Most people believe that many animals are conscious, c'apable of pleasure 
and pain, and have beliefs and desires. Scientists and philosophers have often 
ignored common sense (but see Malcolm, 1949) in favor of a current orthodoxy 
such as positivism or behaviorism. With the rise of cognitive ethology common 
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sense is reasserting itself (Rips and Conrad, 1989). It is becoming respectable for 
scientists and philosophers to believe what ordinary people have known all 
along. 
Nowadays, it would seem that people studying nonhumans could not avoid 
thinking about how they view their subjects (Lynch, 1988), what they are doing 
to them, why they are doing it, and what happens to these animals when they are 
no longer needed for research purposes (Rollin, 1981; Linden, '1986; Lynch, 
1988). Indeed, it is frightening to think that a human being could be so detached 
as to ignore the consequences of his or her actions, regardless of what position he 
or she might take on abstract issues about animal rights. Nonetheless, many 
humans treat inanimate personal property such as cars with more care and con-
cern than they do animals. Various forms of detachment permit some humans to 
do unbelievable things to animals (see Serpell, 1986, for a discussion of human 
detachment strategies) and to exercise their evolutionary privilege (Bekoff, 1977) 
in questionable ways. It is easy to cite horror stories. 18 
We favor a moderate view with respect to animal research that in the present 
climate has radical implications (Jamieson, 1985a). It suggests that some re-
search is justified, but much is not. At a fundamental moral level this moderate 
view holds that, everything else being equal, it is wrong to harm animals. For this 
reason we should avoid research that involves harm to animals whenever we can. 
If an animal can be studied in a noninvasive setting, we should prefer this to 
more aggressive approaches. We should design alternatives to the harmful uses 
of animals where that is possible, and we should eliminate redundant or badly 
designed research that is mainly performed out of ignorance or to boost careers. 
As Caplan (1983) notes, experiments that harm animals are always morally 
tragic. 
Although the search for alternatives continues, and in some cases with great 
success (Goldberg and Frazier, 1989; Perrigo et al., 1989; see also the journal 
Alternatives to Laboratory Animals), there are complicated issues involved. An 
alternative is by definition different from that to which it is an alternative. 
Whether or not something is regarded as an alternative or a replacement (Balls, 
1989) depends on many factors. Furthermore, different issues are involved when 
considering alternatives used in education and those used in basic research. 
Some veterinary schools {for,e~~mple, Colorado State University; B. Rollin 
'"·"·~"-'"----..._ 
18For example, voluntarily submerging polar bears in oil to d~telrninethe effects of oil spills on these 
elegant carnivores (Jamieson and Regan, 1982, p, 182), subjecting otherwise healthy animals to ills 
caused by smoking (Godlovitch, 1971), breeding a plethora of breeds of domestic dogs for show 
that suffer from genetic and behavioral anomalies (Daniels and Bekoff, 1990), or forcing rats to 
swim to exhaustion and then allowing them to drown due to "hopelessness" (Richter, 1957; see 
also Seligman, 1975), It is interesting that one could attribute to rats the ability to experience 
"hopelessness" and then subject them to this treatment. For other examples see Singer (1975) and 
Gruen et al. (1987). 
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personal communication) permit alternatives to practicing surgery on laboratory 
animals. These alternatives involve viewing surgical procedures both live and on 
video and assisting operations on client anifnals. It is easy to see why some 
would deny that these alternatives are equivalent to performing pra~tice surgery. 
Watching a video of surgery is just not the same as performing siirgeryoBut from 
another point of view these alternatives may be regarded as equivalent.' C~ently _ 
there is a follow-up study underway to see_whether trained surgeons watching 
videos _of surgery can distinguish between those performed by students who had 
performed practice surgeries and those performed by students who had not. If, as 
some suspect, trained observers cannot distinguish between these groups, this 
would be reason to say that the alternatives were equivalent. The point,-after-all, 
is to train competent veterinarians, not to compel people to engage in practice 
surgery. i) ' 
Obviously, in social ethological research it is often very difficult to find 
alternatives to using live animals. However, M. W. Fox's (1989) suggestion 
about using animals that are already sick or harmed can be extended to ,some 
types of behavioral research. For example, a great deal of social isolation re-
search has been done that subjects normal infants to extreme deprivation in order 
to assess the effects of being reared without siblings, peers, or adults. This 
research often produces extreme and irreversible behavioral anomalies in animals 
who "look normal" (Bekoff, 1976a; Mason and Capitanio, 1989). If it is neces-
sary to do this research, it may be pos'sible to assess the effects of "social // 
isolation" of different degrees by studying animals or humans (e.g., Werner)/ . 
1989) who have experienced various amounts of social interaaion·during early-
development in the groups in which they normally are reared. 19 
Although there are complications about what constitutes alternatives, con-
venien~e and budgetary constraints should not stand in the way of their develop-
ment, nor should animals be used to unnecessarily duplicate studies 
(pseudoreplication: Hurlbert, 1984; Kroodsma, 1989, 1990; Searcy, 1989) that 
do not lead to any significant advancement in knowledge. Furthermore, in some 
cases animal models simply are not useful fm:_understanding what may appear to 
be similar human behavior patterns (Home, 1989). If harmful research on ani-
mals is to be justified, it must be shown that net benefits would result from doing 
the research; and the harms must be reduced as much as possible. As Balls 
(1989, p. 356) stresses, "as moral agents, we have a responsibility to ensure that 
the likely suffering/potential benefit calculation is properly balanced, that ani-
mals, at home or in research institutions, do live a life characteristic of a good 
life for that species." 
19Jt should be noted that such experiments have been sharply criticized (Bekoff, 1976a,b) and many 
think that they should not be continued at all (Singer, 1975; Jamieson and Regan, 1982). As Jolly 
(1985, p. 238) lamented: "We rear infants in isolation, which was fascinating when we could not 
imagine the results, but can now be seen as cruelty." 
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The calculations and trade-offs required by a moderate view are very diffi-
cult. Indeed, John Stuart Mill, one of the fathers of Utilitarianism, wrote that 
"Utility is an uncertain standard, which every different person interprets differ-
ently" ( 1861; see Ryan, 1987, p. 328). It would be easier to implement the 
traditional "anything goes" view favored by many scientists or the abolitionist 
view favored by many animal rights activists. But we believe that these difficul-
ties in decision making must be faced because the moderate view is the correct 
one. Contrary to those who favor<'anything goes," it is morally wrong to harm 
animals unnecessarily. Contrary to 'the abolitionists, it is sometimes permitted to 
sacrifice one fdr the good of many. ·. 
A practical utilitarian stance on ethological research has recently been of-
fered by Driscoll and Bateson (1988). They identify three variables that must be 
considered in evaluating a given research project: animal pain, concrete probable 
knowledge, and quality of research. In the best of circumstances it would be 
difficult to evaluate each of these categories and possible interactions among 
them, and to assign quantitative assessments of relative costs and benefits 
(Finsen, 1990). But there are also some deeper problems that must be faced by 
any credible moderate view. First, we do not have very good accounts of some of 
the values at stake, for example, the value of knowledge. Second, it is difficult to 
know how disparate values (for example, pain vs. knowledge) should be traded 
off, against each other. Third, in part because we have not taken animal welfare as 
seriously as we should, we are surprisingly ignorant about what "well-being" is 
for many animals and how to treat them in ways that are least damaging to them. 
. Anot[ler difficulty with a moderate view concerns its implementation. It is 
researchers and other humans who calculate the benefits of research, not the 
animal subjects who bear the costs. For this reason there is always the possibility 
of self-deceiving or self-promoting b~havior. In practice, the committees that 
pass on the permissibility of animal research are biased against animals and often 
inconsistent because of the committee's makeup. As a partial solution to these 
problems we favor the addition of an animal advocate to such committees (Jam-
ieson and Colby, 1988). This person's role would be to represent the interests of 
those who would bear the costs of the research. If this proposal were adopted, it 
would bring animal research committees into line with human research commit-
tees. Federal regulations have special requirements-for review committees that 
consider research proposals whose human subjects are ~specially vulnerable and 
may not be able to give informed consent, such as prisoners, children, and the 
retarded. In the case of proposed research involving prisoners, federal regula-
tions require that a prisoner representative sit on the review committee. If any-
thing, animals are more vulnerable than children, prisoners, and the retarded and 
just as unable to give informed consent. 
What we have said so far may seem pleasantly vague and honorific. Many 
people do not favor the "anything goes" view or the abolitionist view, and thus 
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may feel comfortable with what we say . .It may make some people happy to be 
included under the large tent of moderation that masks m~ny real disagreements. 
On the other hand, those who are really struggling with these difficult is~ues 
about animal research m~y feel let down or unenlightened by what we have ;aid. 
The problem is this. To some extent we want to avoid specific mandates 
about what is and what is not permissible. We believe that the general framework 
for which we havebeen arguing is more important than any specific conclusions 
that we may draw from it. What is important is that we change our attitudes 
toward animals, that we see many animals not only as feeling pleasure and pain 
(Balls, 1989), but as being cognitive, affective creatures with rich social lives -~ 
who have interests that ought to be taken as seriously as our own, and that we 
reform our procedures in such a way that these interests are taken into account. If 
this is accomplished then radical changes with respect to how animals are treated 
will follow as a consequence. 
We are also concerned that hostile or defensive readers will focus on our 
conclusions and ignore the reasons and arguments that we give for them. They 
will say that if Bekoff and Jamieson believe such and such about some specific 
line of research, then they should not be taken seriously. One thing we might 
learn from philosophy is that it cannot be that the only thing that is wrong with an 
argument is its conclusion. If people disagree with our conclusions, then it is 
incumbent upon them to show where our arguments have gone wrqng. A second 
thing we might learn from philosophy is that arguments themselves are at least as 
important as conclusions. One message of this chapter is that we need to reasO'n 
better and more rigorously about our relations with other animals. Obsessions 
about the "political correctness" of various conclusions only get in the way of 
this. Having expressed these reservations and trepidations, we will now go on to 
make some specifiC claims and recommendations about various lines of research. 
.i ,. 
The first substantive point is this. Sometimes people of different persuasions 
agree that "unnecessary" research should be abolished. But as Finsen (1990) 
points out, the word "unnecessary" carries different meanings for different 
people. -some scientists think of ends as given, and the question of necessity 
arises with respect to the efficiency of certain means for achieving these ends. 
With this view, means can be criticized as unnecessary, but whole lines of 
research cannot, especially if they are funded by a prestigious agency. This is an / 
unacceptably weak notion of "unnecessary." Using the word in this sense would 
not permit us to say that the hypothermia experiments done in German concentra-
tion camps were unnecessary. Given the research objectives, exposing people to 
extremely cold temperatures for long periods of time was necessary.'For this was 
the most efficient way of carrying out the research. If a prohibition against using 
animals is to have any significance, it must allow us to identify some research 
objectives as "unnecessary," and not just the means that are used to pursue fixed 
objectiv~s. 
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Of course, it could be argued that in one sense no research objective is 
unnecessary. All investigation produces knowledge, even if it is just that a 
particular approach is silly and not worth pursuing. But this view fails to take the 
moral costs of animal research seriously. Research that is unnecessary is research 
that is redundant, pointless, unlikely to result in significant or usable knowledge, 
or simply not worth the cost in animal suffering or death; this type of research 
should be opposed. Although this is a moderate position, it is a hard line. No one 
likes to be told that the work they or their friends do is immoral. It should be 
remembered that people with good character and intentions can do what is 
wrong. 
The next question that arises concerns what research is unnecessary in the 
sense that we have specified. Most of us are aware of research that falls into this 
category, even if we are reluctant to talk about it. Most of us are aware of 
hypotheses that were either wildly implausible, or could have been excluded on 
logical or conceptual grounds if people would have just thought about them (see 
DiDomenico and Eaton, 1990), yet were systematically pursued despite the cost 
in animal welfare (Jamieson and Regan, 1982). In addition to this kind of unnec-
essary research, there is other work whose results are unlikely to justify the costs 
and whose continuation should be seriously questioned. Although much of this 
work continues, some of what has been done in the past would not pass review by 
some animal welfare committees or the results could not be published in profes-
sional journals that have strict policies concerning animal welfare. 
We have already mentioned one area in which research may be unnecessary 
in the sense of not being worth the costs: social deprivation experiments (see, for 
example, Stephens, 1986). Other work that might fall into this category includes 
extreme uses of sensory deprivation; extreme forms of immobilization or starva-
tion; experiments intended to create animal models of human stress by shocking 
animals; some studies of learned helplessness that try to model human depression 
using electric shock or by forcing rats to swim until they were exhausted and die 
(Seligman, 1975; Hahner, 1989); artificially staged encounters to study ag-
gressive behavior or predator-prey relationships (Huntingford, 1984)20; some 
experimental analyses of infanticide; and perhaps research that requires castrat-
ing animals. 
Having gestured toward some lines of..research that we think are difficult t() 
justify, it is important to remember that reaso.nable people can disagree about 
some particular lines of research. What we hope to have shown is that reasonable 
people cannot disagree about the necessity for reforming our practices witll 
respect to animals and the changes of outlook that may be required to do so. 
20'fhe senior author would no longer participate in studies that he performed in the mid to late 1970!; 
on predatory behavior in coyotes. For specific examples in these and other areas of research in. 
which careful scrutiny should now be required with respect to animal welfare, see Fox (1980), 
Gruen et al. (1987), and Coats (1989). 
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VII. ETHOLOGICAL RESEARCH, METHODOLOGICAL 
INTERVENTION, AND VALUE-LADEN SCIENCE 
.27~ 
,, 
There are no 'unintelligent' animals; only careless observations and poorly designed experi, 
ments. (Szentagothai, 1987, p. 323) . . .. · 
All scientific endeavors, including ethological research, involve asym-
metrical relationships between humans and their animal charges and are either 
theory laden or value laden, or both, to some degree. Other than instances of 
companion animals controlling their owners and captive animals in zoos and 
research laboratories needing to be fed on schedule and cared for in otlier_ways _ 
by humans, humans are largely in control of their relationships with nonhumans. / 
Humans decide if, what, when, and how much their companion animals will be \ 
fed, whether and with whom they will breed, how they will be housed, and if ' 
they will be cared for and what types of care they will receive. Humans also 
make decisions about what characteristics they desire in domestic species and are 
basically free to try to achieve their own goals, even if this is contrary to the 
interest of the animals (Daniels and Bekoff, 1990). 
In addition there may also be strong and, in some cases, unavoidable biases 
in the methods that are used to study animals (including humans) and the ways 
data are interpreted (for a general discussion 1of fallacies found in all types of 
research, see Fischer, 1970). Some of our intuitive perceptions of observed 
sequences of behavior can be wrong (Gilovitch et al., 1985). Decisions about 
/ 
how to categorize behavior (Bernstein, 1990; Fentress, 1990) inay·also greatly r 
affect what we observe and the inferences we draw from it, and these categoriza-
tions may be influenced by theoretical expectations (D'Udine and Alleva, 1982). 
Instruments that we employ may actually create new phenomena (Hacking, 
1989) or fail to reflect accurately what is occurring in nature (Mpitsos and 
Cohan, 1986). Sometimes the very fact of our intervention leads to difficulties in 
gaining the knowledge that we seek (Hediger, 1974; Un1iker-Sebeok and Sebeok, 
1980, p. 22; Burley et al., 198221 ; Irle and Markowitsch, 1987; Caine, 1990; 
Wilder, 1990). 
Value judgments are involved in framing questions, in collecting data, and 
in analyzing results. Statistical procedures can be abused because of false as-
sumptions, misinterpretations, or incorrect inferences (Huff, 1954; Salmon, 
1984; Howson and Urbach, 1989). Results can be reported or summarized in 
ways that are misleading or they can be selectively disseminated (Nelkin, 1987; 
Bazerman, 1988; Fuller, 1988; Hull, 1988; Bekoff, 1989a). In the United States 
21This study is particularly interesting because it was shown that mate choice in zebra finches was 
influenced by the colored leg bands that were used to mark individual birds. Females with black 
rings and males with red rings had higher reproductive success than birds with other colors. Blue 
and green rings were especially unattractive on females and males, respectively. 
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as in most, perhaps all countries, individual researchers especially in the early 
stages of their careers, are controlled to a great extent ~y,what peers and funding 
agencies deem to be important. Funding agencies are managed by bureaucrats 
and politicians who are largely ignorant about science and whose fates are 
controlled by superiors or voters, who may also be generally ignorant about 
science and indifferent to the important issues that are at stake (Feyerabend 
1975; see also Hull, 1988; Redner, 1988; Tweney, 1989). For all these reason~ 
there are many openings for value judgments and commitments to enter the 
scientific process; a truly objective, theory-free and value-free scientific enter-
prise is virtually impossible. 22 Because of its irreducibly interpretive and trans-
action~lnature, behavioral research may be especially subject to the influences of 
value judgments and theoretical commitments. 
Given that research questions are theory laden and value laden to· some 
degree and affected by voluntary or imposed predispositions to view the world in 
specific ways, we can ask how objective is behavioral research when performed 
under different circumstances (see also Jamieson, 1985b and Robinson, 1989 for 
discussions with respect to zoo research). In our view ndninterventive behavioral 
research on captive animals refers to an impossible situation (Hediger, 1964, 
1968, 1974; Goodall, 1987; Davis and Allen, 1989). We need to ask how valid 
are data collected on animals that are used in the same study but housed in 
different ways (Kuhn and Hardegg, 1988), how housing itself influences behav-
ior (West and King, 1988; Chamove, 1989; Home, 1989; Segal, 1989; de Waal, 
1989; White et al., 1989), and how valid are data collected on mistreated indi-
viduals. In some cases good science and humane treatment go together. Not only 
is social housing of some species of monkeys more humane, but maintenance 
costs can be reduced and breeding success increased by allowing contact with 
conspecifics (de Waal, 1989). 
In addition to epistemological and methodological issues, there are also 
questions df moral intervention and animal welfare. As mentioned above, even if 
captive animals look normal, one cannot assume that they have not been manipu-
lated or mistreated (Bekoff, 1976a). William Thorpe, a leading ethologist during 
the Lorenz-Tin bergen era, argued that animals suffer when they are unable to 
perform activities that are natural to them (Thorpe, 1965; for further dJs_cussion, 
see Rollin, 1981 and McFarland, 1989). The effects of the removal of animals 
from their natural habitats (or those in which they are typically found) must be 
considereo on the utilitarian tally sheet. 
With respect to most"mam~als and birds, whether or not individuals are 
captured and transported to laboratoi'ies.or zoos or born in these facilities, they 
are typically not in social (West and King, 1988) or biotic environments that even 
22See Rosenthal (1976); Merchant (1980); Dagg (1983); Keller (I ()85); Tweney and Yachanin (1985); 
Murray (1986); Latour and Woolgar (1986); Radii (1986); Campan et at. (1987); Latour (1987); 
Loehle (1987); Nickel (1987); Rollin (1987, 1989a,b); Rouse (1987); Fuller (1988); Giere (1988); 
Hull (1988); Csanyi (1989); Haraway (1989); and Stevenson (1989). 
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closely resemble the natural situations in which they .are'lypically found. It is 
often assumed that fish, other vertebrates, and many in~ects can be maintained in 
conditions that are very similar to th~ ones in which they are usually found, but 
this may be due to the fact;that we know less about them. Even if the captive 
environment closely simulates the natural haoiU\t, the captive situation is not 
identical to the natural situation, and intervention w'UI influence not only the 
nature of the questions asked but also how the data are collected. How signifi-
cantly the intervention influences results. depends on the questions being asked. 
Of course, we may never know how distorted our views are because we have no 
independent-nontheoretic, noninterventive-access to reality, and indeed, the 
idea of such a reality may not even make sense. 
Field research is also interventive to varying degrees (Michener, 1989). )~ 
Thinking of an animal population as a "resource" is aireadY,to take a value-laden 
stance that may quickly lead to bad consequences for the animals (Jamieson and 
1 
Regan, 1985). Handling, trapping (McKenzie, 1989), and' marking individuals 
with dyes or forcing them to wear colored leg bands, wing tags (Kinkel, }_989), 
ear tags and/or radio transmitters (Aldridge and Brigham, 1988; Brigham, 1989; 
Sorenson, 1989) may constitute significant intervention: Manipulating the size 
and composition of social groups by removing, adding, or substituting indi-
viduals is extremely interventive, more so perhaps than some research that is 
conducted on captive animals. Mere human presence is also interventive (see, for 
example, Caine; 1990) and in some situations the questions that are really being 
asked may read: "How often do adult males dominate younger males in the 
presence of the research team?" or "How successfully do c6yotes kill mice in 
the presence of the research team?" ' ~, 
Field research is interventive and we should recognize the situation for what 
it is. As with research on captive animals, the effects of our interventions will 
depend on how disruptive the intervention is and our limitations in dealing 
adequately with questions being asked (Jamieson, 1985b). Since behavior is 
considered to be a significantly more modifiable phenotype when compared with 
anatomical and physiological characters, the application to humans of behavioral 
models developed from animal research needs to be carefully (re)evaluated for 
the reasons that we have suggested. 
VIII. WHERE TO FROM HERE: TOWARD A 
REFLECTIVE ETHOLOGY 
Perhaps biologists do need, in Robert Hinde's terms, more humility and philosophical under-
standing, since the political misuse of biological concepts can have serious and long-lasting 
consequences. (Lee, 1989, p. 317) 1 
As Dunbar (1989) stresses, good ethologists need to think themselves into 
the minds of their animals. This may involve anthropomorphism in comparative 
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and evolutionary studies of animal minds and this is permissible when carefully 
done (Darwin, 1871, 1872; Dennett, 1983; Fisher, 1987, 1990, Chapter 2, this 
volume; Kamil, 1988; de Waal, 1989). Both anthropomorphism and the careful 
use of anecdotes may be necessary for the generation of interesting hypotheses 
(Kamil, 1988; Whiten and Byrne, 1988; but see Bennett, 1988).23 The reflective 
ethologist takes seriously the question of what it is like to be a bee, a bat, a 
coyote, or a field mouse. 
A second aspect of a "reflective ethology" concerns the importance of 
humans using their power over other animals wisely. Ethical questions are intrin-
sic to scientific practice. Although animals may have "lost their minds" (Rollin, 
1990) in the heyday of behaviorism, it is no longer defensible to maintain this 
stance. More ingenious, less interventive, and less harmful "critical" experi-
mental (Platt, 1964; Quinn and Dunham, 1983) and observational tests are 
needed to study animal minds, especially in field situations (Balda and Threk, 
1984; Kamil, 1984, 1988; Guilford and Dawkins, 1987; Allen, 1989; Catchpole, 
1989; Kroodsma, 1989, 1990; Searcy, 1989), and they should be developed, 
taking into account all possible variables in the utilitarian equation. 
The double standard of demanding more rigorous data in studies of mind 
than we require in other scientific endeavors also needs to be stopped, especially 
by people who use unrealistic standards to deny mental continuity between 
humans and other animals or to evade responsibility for what they are doing to 
animals in their research. If higher cognitive abilities and mental states are 
attributed to animals, then it seems reasonable to take the stance that these 
animals also are capable of pleasure and pain and to take this into consideration 
when designing a research project. 
Reflective ethologists also carefully consider the point of studying animals, 
the motivation for the questions asked, and the use of their research findings. OUr 
responsibilities do not end in laboratories or in zoos. Ethological research has 
great appeal to many people who never have any close contact with research 
establishments but only see animals as Rin Tin Tin, Lassie, or Bambi, or in the 
plethora of television shows about natural history. The way in which we represent 
animals influences greatly the manner in which nonscientists view and treat thettt 
(see Blount, 1974, for a survey of fictional animals in children's literature; see 
also Coats, 1989; Hoage, 1989; Robinson, 1989). 
Ethology is also fundamental for fields such as veterinary medicine. Phys-
iologists, too, may look to ethological·findingsto learn how the animals they are 
studying should be kept with respect to cage sizes:feeoing schedules, exercise 
regimens, and the types of social groups in which they best thrive. Wildlife 
managers, zookeepers, and scientists operating wildlife parks may also he in-
terested in similar information. 
23Cf. Wenner (1989) on "Disneyfication." 
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Ultimately, however, we must reflect on why we study animals. Many !" -
different motivations are possible. We may study animals because they provide 
specific instances of more general theories. We may study animal's to learn more 
about humans. Our concerns may be mainly with managing animals and control-
ling their behavior. We may simply be motivated by a general curiosity about 
how they work. But we also may wish to study animals because we respect Jhem, . 
and find them mysterious, and perhaps even awe inspiring. This attitude may .. ' 
lead us to study animals, but with great restraint because we respect them. · 
We may be in the midst of a historical change in-how humans view them-
selves and their place in nature. Such world-historical changes occur, but often 
quite slowly. We still must muddle through each day. The moderate view that we 
advocate permits some research, but it is not a compromising stance in which / 
moral standards may be sacrificed for convenience, money, or efficiency. Those--
who share our perspective can do a lot for animals simply by making people 
think about what they do and why they do it. There is also a role for changes in 
law and regulation. For example, we might require "pet" owners to be examined 
and licensed before they can take on the responsibility for another life (Bekoff, 
1989c). Zak (1989) notes that legal barriers against the exploitation of animals 
are necessary because law not only enforces morality but also defines it. A 
combination of stiffer laws and changes in human morality with respect to how 
animals are treated may be one practical approach to the problems that we now 
confront. 
In the last decade or so we have made significant advances in understanding 
human-animal relationships and in furthering our knowledge about the cognitive 
abilities of diverse species of animals. Increasing numbers of people are thinking 
about these issues as evidenced by exchanges in widely circulated periodicals 
such as Science, Nature, American Scientist, and The Scientist. There are federal 
laws, almost all professional societies have ethics committees, and major jour-
nals in many fields assess the conditions in which animal subjects are kept and 
how data are collected (but see Orlans, 1989; Porter, 1989). Most research 
universities and colleges have committees that oversee animal care. Too often, 
however, these committees are seen as unnecessary or intn:i'~ive, and their deci-
sions arbitrary. As we have argued, more needs to be done with respect to how 
we treat-animals in research situations (Obrink, 1983; Finsen, 1988, 1990; Gal-
lup and Beckstead, 1988). 
The marriage of ethology and philosophy provides a good way to pursue 
these issues. Philosophical points often seem obvious in principle but are lost in . 
practice (Jamieson, 1988; see also Dombrowski, 1988; Midgley, 1989). Philoso-
phers of science and mind can learn from ethological findings (Kalikow, 1987; 
Dombrowski, 1988; Kalikow and Mills, 1989; Dennett, 1989). Ethologists can 
benefit from philosophers' expertise in reasoning and their access to various 
intellectual traditions. A special relationship is already emerging between these 
I.'( 
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fields. Data produced by ethologists have the potential to transform our views of 
ourselves and the world. The theoretical and moral perspectives of philosophers 
are needed if this transformation is to become actual. 
Nature does not know our disciplinary divisions. Arguably it is the rupture 
between fields and disciplines, science and philosophy, the descriptive and the 
normative, reason and emotion, that is partly responsible for bringing to the edge 
of extinction many plants and animals, and perhaps even ourselves (Midgley, 
1989). If each of us becomes at least a little bit of a philosopher and a little bit of 
an ethologist, this may be one way to begin putting things back together. 
Our hope is that those who are predisposed to ignore their moral obligations 
to animals because they just do not care, because no one has a right to tell them 
what t~ think or do, because convincing data are not available, or because it is 
inconvenient will reassess their positions. In this way, they may become more 
connected to a planet from which we have become extremely detached in a very 
short period (in geological terms: Simons, 1989). We need to ask ourselves just 
what and who we are (Chance, 1989) and whether the animals would miss us as 
much as we would miss them. Maybe it is we who are superfluous (R. Fox, 
1989), and perhaps we will discover that our "superior intelligence" is not such a 
good thing after all. 
Cynics may argue that most of the life around us is carried on by creatures which are not 
particularly intelligent. They all survive in offspring whereas man, in spite of all his intel-
ligence, imagination, and ingenuity is about to endanger his further existence by his advanced 
technology of warfare and by overexploiting his environment. A less intelligent Homo is 
perhaps the solution. He might be less harmful to his environment and 'thus less suicidal. 
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1986, p. 191) 
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